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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1990).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court correctly granted summary

judgment when the plaintiff failed to provide competent evidence
to support a products liability claim?
2.

Whether the trial court correctly denied plaintiff

leave to amend her complaint to include a claim under the res
ipsa

loquitur

doctrine?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary
judgment under a "correctness standard."

Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.,

Inc.. 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991).
The trial court's broad discretion to deny a leave to
amend a pleading will only be disturbed if it is found to be an
abuse of discretion.

Hill v. State Farm. 183 U.A.R. 70, 74

(1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides in part:
(c)

[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
(e)

[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides in part:
[a] party may amend his pleading once as
a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served, or if the
pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has
not been placed upon the trial calendar,
he may so amend it at any time within
twenty days after it is served.
Otherwise, a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 provides the following:
In any action for damages for personal
injury, death or property damage allegedly
caused by a defect in a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to
have a defect or to be in a defective
condition, unless at the time the
product was sold by the manufacturer or
other initial seller, there was a defect
2

or defective condition in the product
which made the product unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer.
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably
dangerous" means that the product was
dangerous to an extent beyond which
would be contemplated by the ordinary
and prudent buyer, consumer or user of
that product in that community
considering a product's characteristics,
propensities, risks, dangers and uses
together with any actual knowledge,
training, or experience possessed by
that particular buyer, user or consumer.
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption
that a product is free from any defect
or defective condition where the alleged
defect in the plans or designs for the
product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing
the product were in conformity with
government standards established for
that industry which were in existence at
the time the plans or designs for the
product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing
the products were adopted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Belov.
The plaintiff brought this personal injury lawsui

based on allegations that she sustained injuries caused by an
elevator's abrupt and repetitive rising and falling over a
distance of several floors for a forty-minute period.
In her original complaint in March 1988, the plaintiff
alleged a strict product liability claim against defendant
3

Kimball Elevator Company ("Kimball").

(R. at lc-6.)

The

plaintiff was granted leave of court in February 1990 to add
additional defendants.

(R. at 136-37; 144-50.)

Then, in

October 1990 plaintiff sought to amend her complaint again in
order to add a cause of action based on the doctrine of res
loquitur.

(R. at 242-53.)

ipsa

While that second motion to amend was

pending, defendant Kimball moved for summary judgment because the
plaintiff could not meet her burden of proof on her product
liability claim.

(R. at 268.)

In March 1991, Judge David S.

Young granted Kimball's motion for summary judgment and denied
plaintiff's second motion for leave to amend.

(R. at 377-78.)

The remaining defendants then moved for summary
judgment, asserting that they had no notice of the allegedly
dangerous condition of the elevator.
court also granted that motion.

(R. at 381-93.)

The trial

(R. at 424-25.)

The plaintiff now appeals.
B.

Statement of Facts.
The plaintiff alleges that in 1984, while she was

employed as a legal secretary for a law office at 185 South State
Street, she suffered injuries due to the defective movement of an
elevator.

(R. at 341, 347-48.)

The plaintiff states that on

April 16, 1984, she left the eighth floor to go the sixth floor
to take out the mail and make some photocopies.
4

The plaintiff

contends she entered the elevator for her return trip to the
eighth floor, the doors closed, the lights went out, and that for
the next forty minutes she was alone in the dark elevator while
it repetitively moved upwards several floors, abruptly stop, and
then dropped several floors.

(R. at 342-46.)

The plaintiff

asserts that this erratic and repetitive movement caused her to
become disoriented and fall, thereby injuring her head, arms, and
legs.

(R. at 347-48.)

The plaintiff claims that she attempted

to use the elevator's emergency phone to no avail.
348-49.)

(R. at

Finally, according to the plaintiff's account, the

elevator became stuck between the fifth and sixth floors from
where she was able to free herself by prying open the doors and
jumping to the floor below.

(R. at 351-52.)

The evidence adduced from discovery proves that what
the plaintiff alleges simply could not happen —

the elevator

equipment is not capable of operating in the manner described.
Take for instance, the deposition testimony of Kimball Elevator's
serviceman, Kenneth L. Fuller.

He has been a certified elevator

technician for more than 21 years and was responsible for
servicing the elevators at 185 South State at the time of the
alleged incident.

(R. at 274, 291.)

As part of his job,

Mr. Fuller conducted weekly inspections and service.
testified in his deposition that these elevators were
5

Mr. Fuller

"exceptionally good elevators," that the elevators were equipped
with numerous safety devices, and that it would be "impossible"
for the elevators to operate in the manner described by
plaintiff.

See R. at 385 ff 8-10.

Ross A. Harrison, another Kimball technician, has been
an elevator serviceman for approximately 18 years.

Mr. Harrison

had serviced the elevators at 185 South State for approximately a
two-year period prior to the alleged incident, and he experienced
no unusual problems with them.

He has never heard of an elevator

operating in the manner described by plaintiff.
M

See R. at 385

11-12.
A third Kimball serviceman, Ted Bambrough, has been a

trained elevator technician for 29 years, and he also had
serviced the elevators at 185 South State.

In all of

Mr. Bambrough's experience, he has never heard of an elevator
doing the things described by plaintiff.

See R. at 385 f 13.

Finally, Brent J. Russon, the manager of Kimball
Elevator, has been in the elevator business for 2 3 years.
Mr. Russon is familiar with the elevators in question and has
been dealing with the owners and managers of the building at 185
South State since 1983.

Based on his 23 years in the elevator

business, Mr. Russon asserted that it was impossible for an

6

elevator to drop and stop and go and stop in the manner described
by plaintiff.

See R. at 386 ff 14-17.

Against the significant weight of this evidence,
plaintiff produced no facts or even theories to explain how the
elevator could physically or mechanically do what she alleges it
did, four years before her complaint was filed.

Plaintiff has

made no effort to identify or even suggest the defect which
caused the elevator's allegedly erratic operation.

There is no

evidence that a special service call was made on the elevator in
question in order to return it to operation after becoming lodged
between the fifth and sixth floors.

There were no witnesses to

confirm even the elevator's final resting place.

There is no

record of special repairs or service on the elevator's lights,
its telephone, or its mechanical system after the alleged
incident.

There is no report from any other users of the

elevator that it operated either before or after in a similar
manner.

In support of her claim that the elevator was defective

and therefore unreasonably dangerous, all the trial court had was
plaintiff's uncorroborated allegation of an impossible event.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This Court should affirm the district court's summary
judgment for defendant, Kimball Elevator.

The district court

correctly found that the plaintiff failed to support her claim
7

that the elevator was defective and that the defect rendered the
elevator unreasonably dangerous.

The undisputed evidence is that

the abrupt movements described by plaintiff are physically and
mechanically impossible.

Without some competent evidence to show

a specific defect, the plaintiff cannot overcome the statutory
presumption that there was no defect in the elevator.
The district court also correctly denied the
plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to add a claim based on
res

ipsa

loquitur.

The doctrine of res

ipsa

loquitur

is only

applicable to fact situations where negligence can be clearly
inferred from the nature of the injury itself.

After two years

of discovery, plaintiff did not produce any evidence of
negligence, and she has yet to suggest what negligence is
inferred from her impossible allegations.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY POUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUPPORT HER STRICT LIABILITY
CLAIM WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
A.

The Summary Judgment Standard:
In Utah, a summary judgment is appropriate when no

genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
8

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure 56(c).

See also Ehlers & Ehlers v. Carbon County, 805

P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991).

Although caution must be applied

in granting summary judgment, Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,
725 (Utah 1985), bare allegations unsupported by any facts are
not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.

Hunt

v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990); Massey v. Utah Power &
Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980).

When a motion for summary

judgment is made "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings" but must otherwise
establish some showing of a genuine issue on which a claim can be
based.
B.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(e).

The Statutory Requirements;
Products liability actions in Utah are governed by Utah

Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et seq.

(1977, amended in 1989).

§ 78-15-6 mandates that:
In any action for damages for personal
injury, death, or property damage allegedly
caused by a defect in a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to have a
defect or to be in a defective condition,
unless at the time the product was sold by
the manufacturer or other initial seller
there was a defect or defective condition in
the product which made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.
(emphasis added).

9

Utah Code

Thus, under the Products Liability Act, the plaintiff
must establish (i) that a defect or defective condition existed
at the time the product was sold, and (ii) that the defect or
condition caused the product to be unreasonably dangerous.
Plaintiff's unsubstantiated claims as to what she experienced in
the elevator do not meet this burden.

Plaintiff's vaunted

deposition testimony is nothing but an elaboration of the
allegations in her Complaint.
In addition, § 78-15-6 also provides a statutory
presumption that a product is not defective when it has met
government standards.
There is a rebuttable presumption that a
product is free from any defect or defective
condition where the alleged defect in the
plans or designs for the product or the
methods and techniques of manufacturing,
inspecting and testing the product were in
conformity with government standards
established for that industry which were in
existence at the time the plans or designs
for the product or the methods and techniques
of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were adopted.
U.C.A. § 78-15-6(3) (emphasis added).

The undisputed evidence is

that the elevator was designed, manufactured and installed in
conformity with applicable government regulations in effect at
that time.

(R. at 278-79; 291.)

Plaintiff suggests that because the alleged incident
occurred before Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
10

1985) was decided, that Section 78-15-6 may not apply in this
case.

In Berry, the court declared the Act's statute of repose

[§ 78-15-3], unconstitutional, but it invalidated the entire Act.
In 1989, the Utah legislature reenacted the Act, amending the
problematic Section 78-15-3, but leaving Section 78-15-6
unchanged.

Thus, Section 78-15-6 was the law at the time of the

alleged incident in 1984, and it was the law when the trial court
granted Kimball summary judgment in 1991. No retroactive
application of this fundamental provision of the Act is urged or
necessary.

Rather, it is the plaintiff who wishes to escape its

decisive effect by having Berry v. Beech Aircraft applied
retroactively to the accident and prospectively to the trial of
this case.
C.

The Standard Under Case Law;
Even if there were no valid Product Liability Act at

the time of the alleged incident, and even if the sections which
remain unchanged in the Act's 1989 reenactment don't apply, the
common law standard is still fatal to plaintiff's claim against
Kimball.

In the seminal case of Hahn v. Armco Steel Co.. 601

P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a products
liability action based on a roof collapse which occurred prior to
the enactment of the Products Liability Act.

In Hahn v. Armco

Steel, the Utah Supreme Court adopted Section 402A, Restatement
11

of Torts (Second) and held that a plaintiff can recover for
strict product liability only if it is shown that the product
harming the plaintiff was "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer" of that product.

601 P.2d at

156.
This holding contains the two-part burden to
demonstrate both (i) a defect in the product allegedly causing
the harm, and (ii) the unreasonably dangerous nature of the
product due to the defect.

It is this standard, based on the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, which had been codified in
the Utah Products Liability Act earlier in 1977. And although
Berry v. Beech Aircraft may have later undermined the Act, it did
not overrule Hahn v. Armco Steel and its progeny.
The interplay of the two requisite elements of strict
product liability is seen in stark relief in Dowland v. Lyman
Prod, for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982), where the Court
addressed a claim against a rifle manufacturer.

Dowland sued

because the barrel of a black powder, muzzle loaded gun exploded
in his hand.

The Utah Supreme Court expressly held that:

In order to recover against [the] defendants,
[the] plaintiff had the burden of showing an
unreasonably dangerous defect in the rifle
distributed by [the] defendants. In the
absence of such a showing, the jury could not
have found defendants liable even if
defendants had failed to present any evidence
whatsoever in their own favor.
12

642 P.2d 380, 381 (emphasis added.)

In Dowland the plaintiff

attempted to prove through four experts that a defect existed in
the barrel's dovetail joint.

But he ultimately lost because his

experts could not show how the alleged defect caused the
accident.

The mere occurrence of the explosion in the gun's

barrel did not suffice.

And, by comparison, where the exploded

barrel was a key trial exhibit in Dowland, here the plaintiff's
claim of a rampaging elevator is in very serious doubt.
Likewise, in Hahn itself, there was "substantial
evidence" on the nature and existence of the defective welds in
the steel joists which were involved in the collapse of the
Fashion Place Mall roof.

601 P.2d 158.

It was not sufficient

for the plaintiff in Hahn simply to allege the roof's failure and
then claim victory due to the unexpected collapse of the roof, a
fact which was a widely known and uncontested event in Hahn.

By

comparison again, in this case the elevator's alleged aberrant
operation is totally unsubstantiated.
D.

What Constitutes Competent Evidence Of A Defect Or Defective
Condition;
In its summary judgment motion, Kimball urged that

because of the technical nature of the product, plaintiff should
have expert testimony to establish the elevator's defect and how
it caused the elevator to become unreasonably dangerous.

In

response, plaintiff asserts that "[l]ay people, such as jurors,
13

are the average users of elevators and therefore are especially
well qualified" to make such determinations,
at 15). This is not the law in Utah.

(Appellant's Brief

In Hahn nine expert

witnesses testified as to the possible defects which caused the
mall's roof to collapse.

601 P.2d at 154. Defective welds in

the joist face plates were the identified culprits.

Id.

In

Dowland, four experts testified about the allegedly defective
design of the barrel's dovetail joints, but plaintiff was still
unsuccessful because none of his experts could show how the
supposed "defect" rendered the barrel of the gun unreasonably
dangerous for ordinary use.

642 P.2d at 381.

Cases like the present one, which deal with technical
mechanical or physical phenomenon, are not within the ken of lay
people.

Normal life experience, such as being a legal secretary,

or even a daily rider of elevators, does not make someone
knowledgeable enough to determine whether a defect existed in an
elevator at the time of sale by the manufacturer, what the defect
was, and how it rendered the elevator unreasonably dangerous.
Cases from other jurisdictions also mandate that
product liability claims cannot succeed without competent
evidence, specifically expert testimony in a technical case,
demonstrating that the alleged defect exists and how that defect
caused the equipment to be unreasonably dangerous.
14

See M & R

Inv. Co, v. Anzalotti, 773 P.2d 729, 731 (Nev. 1989) (because
plaintiff's expert witness could not establish any defect in an
elevator's design, manufacturing, or installation, the plaintiff
"failed to make a prima facie showing that her injury was caused
by a defect in the product . . . •"; McCarty v. FC Kingston Co,,
522 P.2d 778 (Ariz. App. 1974) (service station operator injured
in fall over an automobile hoist required to show the precise
engineering defect, in the control valve alleged to have caused
injury); Power v. Otis Elevator Co., 409 So. 2d 389 (La. App,
1982) (plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove existence of
defect due to an absence of expert testimony).
The need for expert testimony on key elements in
technical cases was specifically addressed in Reeves v. Geigy
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah 1988).

In that case,

the Utah Supreme Court held that expert medical testimony was
required to establish that an allegedly defective drug had caused
the plaintiff's skin injuries.

Plaintiff argues that Reeves is

not applicable because the expert testimony required in that case
went to establish causation and "[c]ausation is not the issue in
this case."

(Appellate Brief at 15.)

To the contrary, under both the statutory and case law
standards, plaintiff has to prove that the defect (whatever it
is) caused the elevator to be unreasonably dangerous for her
15

anticipated use. All of the evidence —

the only evidence —

on

this key issue, is that the elevator simply can't do what
plaintiff claims it did.

Ipso facto, there is no actual or even

inferable defect to have caused the unlikely episode.
At the very least, the plaintiff has to prove that the
event in question actually occurred.

The exploded gun barrel,

the collapsed mall roof, or the errant elevator is an essential
starting point for a strict liability claim.

Plaintiff hasn't

verified that the elevator did what she claims.

She hasn't

attempted to show that it is even hypothetically capable of
becoming the human Martini mixer she describes.

In the

evidentiary void which plaintiff leaves, the statutory
presumption of no defect and Kimball's evidence of impossibility
are decisive.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF
LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
A.

Denial of Motion to Amend was Proper in Light of Time:
A denial of a motion to amend is within the sound

discretion of the trial court.
360, 365 (Utah 1984).

Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d

In Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 663

P.2d 93 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's refusal for a leave to amend because: "[a]n amendment
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would certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full year earlier when
plaintiff discussed it in his deposition."

Id. at 94.

Similarly, the plaintiff here had adequate time to have
included a res

ipsa

loquitur

claim in her pleadings.

The trial

court's decision was based in substantial part on concern for
tardy amendment:
My concern about amending the complaint at
this late date is this is a three year old
case, it is an eight year old injury, and it
seems to me if [res ipsa loquitur] were to be
pled [it] could well have been pled before in
terms of amendment.
(R. at 485.)
B.

Denial of Motion to Amend was Proper in Light of Merits:
In Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), the

Utah Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion where the trial
court refused leave to amend to add a claim for adverse
possession.

The trial court was affirmed, partly because

plaintiff lacked credible evidence to establish the adverse
possession.

Xd. at 365. There is no point in allowing amendment

where the proposed claim is insupportable.
The trial court's denial for leave to amend in this
case should be affirmed for the same reason.

Res ipsa

requires the plaintiff to establish three elements.
follows:
17

loquitur
They are as

(1) . . . [T]he accident was of a kind which in
the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had the defendant(s) used due care,
(2) the instrument or thing causing the injury was
at the time of the accident under the management
and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident
happened irrespective of any participation at the
time by the plaintiff.
Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d 458, 464 quoting Dallev v. Utah
Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990)
(quoting Moore v. James. 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297 P.2d 221, 224
(1956)).

This standard should be no mystery to plaintiff, as her

counsel here also represented the successful defendant/respondent
in Kitchen v. Cal Gas.
* But before the plaintiff's case can be submitted to a
jury on a theory of res

ipsa

loquitur,

foundation must be established.
458, 463.

a threshold evidentiary

Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d

The plaintiff must prove the accident was more

probably than not caused by negligence*

Id. at 464. In

affirming the trial court's denial of amendment to plead res
loquitur

in Kitchen v. Cal Gas, this Court reiterated the

threshold based on Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah
1985) :
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury
instruction on res ipsa loquitur,
the
plaintiff must have presented evidence that
the occurrence of the incident is "more
probably than not caused by negligence." The
plaintiff need not eliminate all possible
inferences of non-negligence, but the balance
18

ipsa

of probabilities must weigh in favor of
negligence, or res ipsa loquitur
does not
apply.
Kitchen, 821 P.2d 458, 464 (emphasis in the original).

The

Ballow opinion added that in some cases where "the probabilities
of a situation are outside the realm of common knowledge, expert
evidence may be used to establish the necessary foundational
probabilities."

Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d at 464, quoting

Ballow, 699 P.2d at 722.
Utilizing this standard, this Court in Kitchen v. Cal
Gas found that the plaintiffs failed to meet even this first
prong.

Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 464. The plaintiffs, lacked any

evidence, even inferential evidence from experts, to show that
the accident would not have happened in the exercise of due care
by the defendant, Cal Gas.
The plaintiff in this case suffers the same fatal flaw.
She hasn't established that the occurrence is even possible,
notwithstanding "more probably than not caused by negligence."
And this flaw in her case exists in the face of a statutory
presumption that no defect exists when the elevator is installed
and certified to governmental standards.

U.S.C.A. § 78-15-6(3).

This court has reached the same conclusion in other
cases:
The mere invocation of the doctrine . . .
does not result in automatic application.
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In

order to rely on res ipsa loquitur, a
plaintiff must first establish a sufficient
evidentiary foundation to support application
of this doctrine and its inference of
negligence.
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264-65
(Utah App. 1985).

In Robinson, the plaintiff's claim of

negligence during a tonsillectomy was properly dismissed by
summary judgment because she failed to produce the necessary
expert testimony.

The reason is obvious:

"The mere happening of

[an] accident . . . does not prove that the defendants were
negligent."

Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596

(1947).
C.

There is No Foundation to Apply Res Ipsa
Plaintiff's Product Liability Claim:

Loquitur

In support of her effort to employ res

ipsa

to
loquitur

for the proof of her strict product liability claim, plaintiff
cites to Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d
193, 196 (Utah 1990), asserting that plaintiff in Dalley "was not
required to allege, much less prove, a product defect — by
expert testimony or otherwise."

(Appellate Brief at 27).

The

plaintiff in Dalley went into a Caesarean section operation
without a burn on her leg and came out with a burn on her leg.
The circumstances suggest negligence, regardless of medical
testimony.
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Dalley is hardly analogous.

No allegedly defective

product was even implicated, and Ms. Dalley had the evidence of a
burn.

The only supporting

evidence plaintiff offers here is

that her boss saw her tousled and distraught in 1984.

She filed

no report to the building about a defective elevator.

She failed

to counter evidence that it is physically impossible for the
elevator to do what plaintiff alleges.

There are no records of

special repairs on the elevator, its lights, or the telephone at
the time of or shortly after the alleged event.

A similar

episode has never been reported by any prior or subsequent users
of the elevator.

The very existence of the event and her injury

is in serious doubt.
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the Utah Supreme
Court has allowed plaintiffs to rely on res

ipsa

loquitur

in

product liability cases, citing, Sanone v. J.C. Penney Co., 17
Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248 (1965).

In Sanone, a two-year old girl

caught her foot in a moving escalator.

The girl's mother picked

her up to help her and found "the skin and muscle tissue of [the
girl's] leg had been severely torn.

From the evidence and the

pictures, there appears to be a deep and severe laceration and
scarring of the leg from just below her knee to just above her
ankle."

404 P.2d 248, 249.
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The majority in Sanone took judicial notice that when
escalator accidents occur "there was something wrong in either
the construction, maintenance or operation. . . . "
250.

404 P.2d at

It then found that because the escalator was under the

exclusive control of the building owner, J.C. Penny, that res
ipsa

loquitur

applied.

Id.

Then, even though the jury found no

negligence by J.C. Penny and no defect in the escalator, the
majority concluded that the plaintiff should recover.
Sanone has rarely been followed as authority, probably
due to its questionable reasoning and holding.

Chief Justice

Henriod's characteristically colorful and powerful dissent,
concurred in by Justice Callister, articulated the majority's
problematic analysis:
I dissent. The plaintiff abandoned its claim
of negligence, and relied solely on the socalled "res ipsa loquitur" doctrine. . . .
Plaintiff abandoned a theory based on
negligence, the burden of which necessarily
was his. In this case 100% reliance was
placed upon the defectiveness of an
escalator. The jury held this escalator was
not defective. That should have ended this
case. . . . The jury said there was nothing
wrong with the escalator, but anyway, [the
defendant] should respond. This not only is
inimical to the historical concept that no
one is liable without fault, but espouses the
dangerous doctrine that one is an insurer
against injury, regardless of the pleadings,
common sense or the facts.
404 P.2d at 250-51 (emphasis added).
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Sanone should be disregarded.

Kimball is a

manufacturer and maintainer of the elevator, not its owner.

The

opinion makes an owner of an escalator the insurer of a
passenger's safety by imposing liability where there was no
showing of negligence or product defect.

This is expressly

contrary to the public policy stated in Hahn v. Armco Steel, 601
P.2d at 157.

Sanone is also inapposite because there was a clear

connection between the escalator's operation and the plaintiff's
injuries in that case; again in the present case, there is no
acute injury or corroborated connection between the elevator's
allegedly aberrant operation and the plaintiff's injuries which
were four years old before they were first asserted.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order of summary judgment should be
affirmed.

Judge David S. Young correctly f.and that plaintiff

has not made a triable claim for strict liability.
presumes no defect.

The statute

Plaintiff has produced no evidence which

contradicts the unanimous testimony of Kimball's experts that
plaintiff's claim is impossible.

Res ipsa

loquitur

cannot be

used to infer a defect because plaintiff has not met the
foundational threshold for that evidentiary doctrine to apply.
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend to add a
negligence claim supported by res
23

ipsa

loquitur

is flawed for the

same reasons as is her claim for product liability.

She has not

established either the foundational requirements of a negligence
case or the circumstantial evidence deserving of an inference of
negligence.

The trial court correctly denied plaintiff's motion

to amend.

/
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